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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) presently under consideration by the Program
Executive Officer for Cruise Missile Projects and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(PEOCMPUAV) will be equipped solely with electro-optical (EO) sensors. This thesis
provides a comparative analysis of the mission effectiveness between UAVs equipped
with EO sensors and those equipped with a multiple sensor system payload.
A historical review of UAV development and employment is provided so that the
reader may gain some insight into past UAV shortcomings in the hopes that they might
be prevented in future systems. A typical Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target
Acquisition (RSTA) mission scenario is defined and a comparison made between UAVs
equipped with EO sensors and those equipped with multiple sensor system payloads. The
measure of effectiveness used for this comparison is the time required by the UAV to
search 100 percent of an assigned area. The physical and operating characteristics of
available sensor systems are discussed in detail.
We develop an optimization model for selecting multiple sensor payloads from
those sensor systems described. The model considers the sensor's physical
characteristics, unit cost, identification capability and false alarm rate when determining
the optimum payload. The optimum sensor system payloads are selected and the best
alternatives to EO sensors for performing RSTA missions in a hostile environment are
recommended under a range of budgets.
THESIS DISCLAIMER
The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed in this research may
not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While effort has been made, within
the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logic
errors, they cannot be considered validated. Any application of these programs







A. PURPOSE OF THE THESIS 2
B. UAV DEVELOPMENT 3
1. The World Wars 3
2. U-2 Reconnaissance Over the USSR 5
3. The Cuban Missile Crisis 6
4. Operations Over Mainland China 6
5. Buffalo Hunter Operations in Southeast Asia 7
6. Israeli Bekaa Valley Operations 10
7. Honduras 11
8. Operation Desert Storm 12
C. SUMMARY 15
II. MISSIONS 18
A. OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW 18
B. RSTA MISSION 19
1. Fixed Targets 20
2. Cued Search 20
3. Area Search 21
4. Targeting and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) 21
C. MISSION SCENARIO 22
1. Scenario 24
a. Optical Sensor Search 25
b. Multi-Sensor Search 26
c. Conclusions 28
D. SUMMARY 29
III. MULTIPLE SENSOR PAYLOADS 31
A. PAYLOADS 33
1. Electronic Data Link Systems 35
2. Radar Systems 37
a. Moving Target Indicator (MTI) Radar 37
b. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) 38
c. Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) 40
3. Electronic Support Measures (ESM) 42
4. Infrared Systems 43
a. Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) 44
b. Infrared Line Scanners (IRLS) 46
B. SUMMARY 48
VI
IV. UAV PAYLOAD SELECTION MODEL 50
A. MODEL DESCRIPTION AND FORMULATION 50
B. UAV PAYLOAD SELECTION MODEL 51
1. Indices 51
2. Data 52
3. Decision Variables 53
4. Objective Function and Constraints 53
C. CONSTRAINT DESCRIPTION 56
D. THE ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS (AHP) 57
V. MODEL RESULTS 62
VI. CONCLUSIONS 70
VI. CONCLUSIONS 74
APPENDIX A: UAV PAYLOAD SELECTION MODEL FORMULATION . . 78





INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 91
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Teledyne Ryan's Buffalo Hunter reconnaissance drone [Ref 6:p. 110]. . 7
Figure 2 Buffalo Hunter reconnaissance photo of Son Tay prison 1 968
[Ref 6:p. 110] 9
Figure 3 Pioneer flight operations onboard a U.S. battleship in the Persian Gulf
[Ref 9:p. 17] 14
Figure 4 SAR imagery of a commercial cargo ship [Ref 17:p. 215] 39
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 PAYLOAD TYPES 35
Table 2 DATA LINKS 37
Table 3 RADAR SYSTEMS 41
Table 4 ESM SYSTEMS 43
Table 5 FLIR SYSTEMS 45
Table 6 IRLS SYSTEMS 47
Table 7 THE FUNDAMENTAL SCALE 58
Table 8 TEST RESULTS USING $500,000 PURCHASING BUDGET 63
Table 9 TEST RESULTS USING $2,500,000 PURCHASING BUDGET
(ALL THREE DATA LINK SYSTEMS AVAILABLE) 65
Table 10 TEST RESULTS USING $2,500,000 PURCHASING BUDGET
(ONLY THE AN/SRQ-4 DATA LINK SYSTEM AVAILABLE). ... 65
Table 11 TEST RESULTS USING $5,000,000 PURCHASING BUDGET
(ALL THREE DATA LINK SYSTEMS AVAILABLE) 67
Table 12 TEST RESULTS USING $5,000,000 PURCHASING BUDGET
(ONLY THE AN/SRQ-4 DATA LINK SYSTEM AVAILABLE). ... 68
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) presently under consideration by the Program
Executive Office for Cruise Missile Projects and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(PEOCMPUAV) will be equipped solely with electro-optical (EO) sensors. They will
be required to perform a variety of missions, among them Reconnaissance, Surveillance
and Target Acquisition (RSTA). These UAVs will be incapable of providing timely
area coverage when tasked to perform such missions in large areas of uncertainty
(AOUs). To address that deficiency, this thesis provides a comparative analysis of the
mission effectiveness between UAVs equipped with EO sensors and those equipped
with a multiple sensor system payload.
In future maritime engagements, organic manned surveillance aircraft may not
always be available to the Strike Warfare Commander (STWC) or Anti-Surface Warfare
Commander (ASUWC), as indicated by the recent deployment of the USS Theodore
Roosevelt without S-3Bs and their Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR). RSTA
missions provide a Surface Action Group (SAG) commander with valuable information
concerning enemy surface activity within his area of responsibility. They allow him to
keep abreast of changes in an enemy's force structure and bring his own forces to bear
on threat sectors of immediate concern to him. Such missions may be tasked against
fixed or mobile targets regardless of the availability or accuracy of cuing data.
A historical review ofUAV development and employment is provided so that the
reader may gain some insight into past UAV shortcomings in the hopes that they might
be prevented in future systems. A typical RSTA mission scenario is defined and a
comparison is made between UAVs equipped with EO sensors and those equipped with
multiple sensor system payloads. The measure of effectiveness used for this
comparison is the time required by the UAV to search 100 percent of an assigned AOU.
A UAV equipped with multiple sensors such as moving target indicator (MTI) radars,
synthetic aperture radars (SAR), electronic support measures (ESM) and infrared (IR)
can cover an entire assigned search area in a fraction of the time required by a UAV
equipped with a single optical sensor. This leaves more time available for target
identification and classification, and frees the UAV to perform secondary missions if
time and fuel permit. A UAV equipped with such a sensor suite is more capable of
providing the SAG commander with timely area coverage, valuable situational
awareness and a broader extension of the SAG's weapons and sensor systems and,
ultimately, it's sphere of influence. The physical and operating characteristics of these
sensor systems is discussed in detail.
The thesis presents a mathematical optimization model capable of selecting from
those systems previously described. UAVs presently under development are capable
of carrying multiple sensor payloads. Because they are smaller in size than manned
platforms, UAVs have only a limited amount of space in which to carry these systems.
The model discussed in this thesis selects a sensor payload from data link, radar, ESM,
and IR systems based on the utility or perceived value of the individual sensor in a
xn
RSTA mission scenario. Sensor systems are selected based upon their weight, volume,
power consumption and unit cost. Additionally, the model considers the sensor's target
identification capability and false alarm rate when determining the optimum payload.
Values for sensor system utility, identification capability and false alarm rate were
derived using the method of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Expert Choice
software. They were verified using the method of paired comparisons.
The optimum sensor system payloads are selected and the best alternatives to EO
sensors for performing RSTA missions in a hostile environment are recommended under
a range of budgets. The model was run for the next generation of Short Range UAV
(SR-UAV) having a 15 ft3 payload cavity, a 1000 W electrical generator and capable
of carrying a payload weighing 200 pounds.
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I. BACKGROUND
As a world power, the United States will continue to maintain global interests and
must be able to influence political events through credible military presence and power
projection capabilities. In the face of steadily decreasing overseas basing and a
shrinking military budget, the United States must maintain the ability, in concert with
allied forces, to execute timely sustained combat operations across the spectrum of
conflict. These capabilities will be instrumental in maintaining regional stability in the
transition to a new post cold war world order.
In future conflicts, littoral power projection will be the U.S. military's primary
warfighting priority. The ability to affect events in a green water scenario will be the
key to successful regional stability operations.
War scenarios presently under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff include
both low- and high-intensity conflicts in littoral regions. U.S. military forces would
most likely be employed in these scenarios to conduct both pre- and post-strike aerial
reconnaissance in support of strikes by joint coalition forces over hostile territory.
Aerial reconnaissance is essential for effective strike planning. However,
reconnaissance missions expose aerial vehicles to threats during intense ingress and
egress near the target area. A relatively low-altitude fly-over is often required to obtain
the detailed tactical imagery needed to identify targets or assess battle damage.
Therefore, in such instances where timely critical intelligence data is required,
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) can provide support with no risk to human life.
A. PURPOSE OF THE THESIS
UAVs presently under consideration by the Program Executive Office for Cruise
Missile Projects and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (PEOCMPUAV) will be equipped
solely with electro-optical (EO) sensors. They will be required to perform a variety of
missions, among them Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA).
These UAVs will be incapable of providing timely area coverage when tasked to
perform such missions in large areas of uncertainty (AOUs). To correct that deficiency,
this thesis provides a comparative analysis of the mission effectiveness between UAVs
equipped with EO sensors and those equipped with a multiple sensor system payload.
The remainder of Chapter I provides a historical review ofUAV development and
employment so that the reader may gain some insight into past UAV shortcomings in
the hopes that they might be prevented in future systems. Chapter II defines a typical
RSTA mission scenario and provides a comparison between UAVs equipped with EO
sensors and those equipped with multiple sensor system payloads. The measure of
effectiveness used for this comparison is the time required by the UAV to search 100
percent of an assigned AOU. Chapter III describes the physical and operating
characteristics of various sensor systems capable of enhancing UAV on-station
performance. In Chapter IV the reader is introduced to a mathematical model capable
of selecting from those systems previously described in Chapter III. Chapter V
provides a summary of the analysis. Throughout this thesis, the author relies heavily
on his experiences as a Patrol Plane Tactical Coordinator onboard Maritime Patrol
Aircraft and as a mission planner on both Patrol Wing and Battle Group Staffs.
B. UAV DEVELOPMENT
The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to support the on-scene
commander has a long history. In the 1890's, U.S. Army researchers stationed at
Madison Barracks in New York experimented with an early aerial reconnaissance
system - a camera hung from a large kite [Ref. l:p. 21].
1. The World Wars
The history of unmanned aircraft started shortly after the first manned flight.
The invention of the radio and internal combustion engine led to attempts at combining
the two in a wood and paper aircraft controlled by a pilot on the ground. As early as
World War I, experimentation began with an unmanned aircraft designed by Charles
F. Kettering and Orville Wright. A conventional biplane, known as the Kettering Bug,
had a 15 ft wingspan and carried a 180 lb bomb a distance of 40 mi at 55 mph.
Conditions on the European battlefields were ideal for such a system: enemy anti-
aircraft weapons were heavily concentrated, Germany had air superiority in certain
sectorr , and there was an extremely static battlefield situation over 470 miles of front.
However, the war ended less than a month after the fourth test flight [Ref. 2].
For the most part, research and development between 1917 and 1959 was
confined mainly to lethal UAVs, the most famous being Germany's V-l buzz-bomb and
air-launched Mistel which consisted of a scrapped JU-88 bomber packed with
explosives carried under an FW-190 fighter. The FW-190 flew the JU-88 over the
target area and dropped it like a bomb. Approximately 250 Mistels were assembled
between 1943 and 1945 for a last ditch Luftwaffe offensive.
Throughout World War II, the U.S. Army Air Force under General H.H.
Arnold made an attempt to develop a somewhat similar system to the Mistel. Old B-17,
B-24, and PB4-Y aircraft were stripped of armament and fitted with command receivers
and 10 tons of explosive. The aircrew consisted of a pilot and a radio operator. Once
airborne, the crew bailed out, and control of the aircraft was taken over by a second
aircraft. The system was abandoned after two accidents in three flights. Joseph P.
Kennedy, Jr., the brother of President Kennedy, was killed while working on this
program [Ref. 3] .
The main drawback of the radio-controlled plane was that it was piloted from
a distance by a pilot who could not see the target from the remotely controlled plane's
perspective. The controller also had to keep in view both the target and the remotely
controlled aircraft, making him vulnerable to enemy anti-aircraft fire. Another kind of
pilotless aircraft, the drone, avoids these problems. Drones are simple, pre-programmed
aircraft, and once launched, are beyond control. A drone can take-off and
autonomously fly a route, changing altitude and direction according to a pre-
programmed mission schedule. It cannot, however, identify local bad weather and fly
around it.
2. U-2 Reconnaissance Over the USSR
Due to concern over the political fallout that would inevitably develop if a
U-2 were to be shot down over Soviet airspace and its pilot captured, the Air Force
started modifying a target drone for photographic reconnaissance missions, three and
a half years after the United States began overflying Russia. On 1 May 1 960, U-2 pilot
Francis Gary Powers was shot down over Russia, ending all chances of a Paris summit
meeting between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev. President Eisenhower
announced the discontinuation of all U-2 flights over the USSR. This was a time when
charges of a "missile gap" dominated the press, the nations first spy satellite would not
become operational for another 18 months and work on the high flying SR-71 was not
yet begun. At the height of the Cold War, the United States had just lost its main
source of intelligence behind both the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. Work began in
earnest on an unmanned reconnaissance vehicle that could penetrate hostile airspace and
bring back accurate photographic intelligence. That work intensified when, two months
after Powers was captured in Russia, an American RB-47 bomber converted for
electronic eavesdropping missions was shot down over the Barents Sea. After six hours
in frigid waters, two of its five crewmen were taken prisoner by the Soviets [Ref. 3].
They were held for seven months until released as a gesture of good will just four days
after the inauguration of President Kennedy [Ref. 4:p. 87]. As a result, a production
contract for a reconnaissance version of the Firebee standard target drone was awarded
to Teledyne Ryan in 1962 under a program called RED WAGON.
3. The Cuban Missile Crisis
On 27 October 1962 President Kennedy demanded that the Soviet Union
dismantle its missile bases and remove its nuclear warheads from Cuba. That same day,
Soviet SA-2 missiles in Cuba shot down a U-2 , killing its pilot Maj Rudolph
Anderson, Jr. With the Cuban Missile Crisis at its peak, the United States needed
photographic confirmation that the Soviets had either removed their missiles or refused
to do so. Only two U-2s were immediately available to continue the Cuban overflights.
Because only two of the Ryan UAVs had been built and their operational testing not
yet completed, RF-8A aircraft were used to image Cuba. The Cuban Missile Crisis
demonstrated a need for a concerted UAV development effort by the U.S. military. By
the August, 1 964 Tonkin Gulf Incident, UAVs were finally ready for wartime service
[Ref. 3] .
4. Operations Over Mainland China
In 1964, while deployed to Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, the Strategic Air
Command's 100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing launched Teledyne-Ryan AQM-34
drones from DC- 130 Hercules aircraft flying along the coast of Mainland China. These
UAVs penetrated Chinese airspace and obtained high-quality photographic imagery of
military facilities and troop movements, and were later recovered on the surface of the
South China Sea. In 1965, the Chinese held a news conference during which they
displayed a downed U.S. pilotless reconnaissance aircraft. This was the first
opportunity the American public had to observe a UAV performing missions too
dangerous or politically sensitive to be undertaken by manned aircraft. UAV operations
against mainland China were suspended by President Nixon in the early 1970s as a
result of improved relations between the two countries [Ref. l:p. 31].
5. Buffalo Hunter Operations in Southeast Asia
During the next eight years, over 5000 American airmen lost their lives in
Southeast Asia because their airplanes were shot down or crashed due to malfunctions.
The Strategic Air Command's 100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing flew more than
3435 unmanned reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam, China and Laos, with an
attrition rate of less than ten percent. They performed photo-reconnaissance, damage
assessment, electronic eavesdropping, jamming, chaff dispersal, and propaganda leaflet
dispersal missions [Ref. 5:p. 162].
Figure 1 Teledyne Ryan's Buffalo Hunter reconnaissance drone [Ref 6:p. 110]
.
UAVs provided photographic imagery deep within enemy territory without
risking their controllers to possible death or capture. They collected targeting data for
the ROLLING THUNDER bombing campaign over North Vietnam [Ref. 3]. The
attrition rate faced by U.S. Air Force and Navy aircrews during the war in Southeast
Asia led to the first employment of UAVs in a combat environment. Over 2500
Buffalo Hunter photo-reconnaissance missions were flown over North Vietnam with an
overall attrition rate of 4%. Photo reconnaissance missions were flown at very low
altitudes. Seven such missions were flown for pre-strike planning in support of the
rescue mission against the Son Tay prison compound located just 22 miles outside of
Hanoi. Two were shot down by North Vietnamese gunners and four suffered
mechanical failures [Ref. 6:p. 81].
Figure 2 Buffalo Hunter reconnaissance photo of Son Tay prison 1968 [Ref 6:p. 110]
Additional UAV missions included electronics intelligence (ELINT)
collection, radar jamming, and chaff deployment [Ref. l:p. 31]. Because Buffalo
Hunter missions were flown at such low altitudes, they were able to provide excellent
photo-reconnaissance in support of SR-71 high-altitude missions and immediate post-
strike battle damage assessment. Lack of a night vision capability forced all missions
to be flown during daylight hours. Navigation inaccuracies made it difficult to
accurately place the UAV where it was needed, with a resulting mission success rate
of 40-60%. Additionally, because Buffalo Hunter carried no data link for timely data
dissemination, the time needed to process and analyze the intelligence data collected
during a mission reduced its value [Ref. 2].
6. Israeli Bekaa Valley Operations
One of the most spectacular operations of modern warfare is the combined
arms effort of the Israelis against the Syrians in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley in June 1982.
Prior to the operation, Israeli Mastiff and Scout UAVs overflew an area known to be
heavily defended by Syrian-manned Soviet-built SA-6 SAM sites and collected
electronic and photographic intelligence later used to develop the Israeli SEAD
(Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) plan. The Syrian air defenses had been dug in
for over a year in the Bekaa Valley, so their positions were known to a high degree of
accuracy. Additionally, the Syrian lack of a strong emissions control (EMCON) policy
allowed the Israelis to record the exact radar frequencies for future jamming, targeting
and programming of anti-radiation missiles.
The first phase of the Israeli attack was meant to stimulate the Syrian
defenses. Mastiff and Scout UAVs previously used to verify and locate Syrian radars
relayed their information to Boeing 707 and Lockheed E-2C command and control
aircraft. Air-launched Sampson and ground-launched Delilah decoy drones flew attack
aircraft profiles, forcing the Syrians to launch most of their available SAMs prior to the
actual arrival of the first wave of Israeli aircraft.
During the second phase of the attack, Mastiff UAVs were used for gunfire
support services against these same SAM sites. Using the ELINT information provided
by earlier UAV sorties, F-4 Wild Weasel aircraft launched Shrike and Standard anti-
radiation missiles destroying the SA-6 fire control radar antennas. With the battle
damage assessment information provided by on-station UAVs, the Israeli tactical
commander was able to order follow-on strikes.
Additionally, the same UAVs employed in the attack against the SAM
batteries loitered overhead Syrian airfields and relayed imagery of Syrian Mig-21s and -
23s taking off to the airborne tactical commander [Ref. 7]. The entire engagement
lasted ten minutes, the final results of which were 17 of the 19 SAM sites destroyed
without the loss of a single Israeli attack aircraft.
7. Honduras
Located between Nicaragua and El Salvador, San Lorenzo, Honduras was the
site of a forward operations base between November 1984 and April 1986, from which
six Skyeye UAVs were deployed in anti-guerilla reconnaissance missions. These
operations demonstrated the need to cue the system to the approximate position of
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potential targets due to the narrow field of view of the infrared sensor. Additionally,
because these missions were conducted in a mountainous region, and the UAVs were
equipped with line-of-sight data links, the typical flight profile called for higher than
normal altitudes over the target area, greatly reducing imagery resolution.
8. Operation Desert Storm
The U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army operated with the Pioneer
UAV system during Desert Shield/Desert Storm Operationsin 1990-1991. Two
battleships were equipped with the Pioneer for the Navy in addition to three Marine
Corps units and one Army unit. Over 530 sorties and 1680 flight hours were flown in
the Southwest Asia Theater. After Desert Storm commenced, nearly 330 sorties and
over 1000 flight hours were flown in theater, with at least one Pioneer airborne 24
hours per day. Twelve Pioneer UAVs were destroyed in the war, two of which are
classified as combat losses [Ref. 8:p. 26].
The Pioneer UAV System provided day or night reconnaissance,
surveillance, targeting, gunfire spotting services, and battle damage assessment through
continuous real-time video downlink to a controlling station where system operators
monitored and recorded air vehicle imagery with little risk to themselves.
In addition to follow-up battle damage assessment, the battleships provided
naval gunfire support against electronic warfare sites, command centers, and anti-aircraft
artillery sites. The UAV provided the battleship the ability to accurately fire on targets
and spot every round fired, resulting in reduced weapons expenditures. These platforms
were then free to engage secondary targets and targets of opportunity.
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Initially, the Marine and Army UAV units were tasked to collect intelligence
against Iraqi troop concentrations along the Saudi-Iraqi border. Despite the fact that
inclement weather prevented their use during the first two days of the ground war,
Pioneer was used to locate and direct counter-battery fire on Iraqi artillery positions,
armored and mechanized units, missile and anti-aircraft emplacements, and support
battle damage assessment for artillery batteries and coalition air strikes. Additionally,
they were used to map Iraqi minefields and bunkers, allowing the Marines to pass
through and around these defenses in darkness, capture key command sites without
warning and speed the advance into Kuwait City. Marine and Army units provided
target identification and cuing for J-STARS aircraft against potential operational areas
that indicated Iraqi activity.
Other innovative approaches in using the Pioneer UAV to support the
battlefield commander were developed and introduced into the conflict. Marine Corps
task force commanders received Pioneer video in their command vehicles and directly
assessed the Iraqi response to the ground assault during the march on Kuwait City. The
Army tasked Pioneer reconnaissance missions to pre-determine flight paths for Apache
helicopters.
The use of Pioneer to collect battlefield management data under adverse
conditions and in a potentially high threat environment without placing air or ground
personnel in harm's way precluded the potential loss of life or additional prisoners of
war during the Desert Shield/Desert Storm operations. The Pioneer UAV operated with
little danger of detection or threat either while flying or operating over hostile forces.
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Their employment eliminated the risks associated in using manned aircraft to collect
required intelligence data or follow-up battle damage assessment. The small size and
detection characteristics of the Pioneer allowed the UAV to sit over hostile areas and
observe activities with minimal risk [Ref. 9:p. 6].
igr^i :;t
Figure 3 Pioneer flight operations onboard a U.S. battleship in the Persian Gulf
[Ref9:p. 17].
A list of UAV shortcomings in the Gulf Conflict was put together primarily
from the services' experience with the Pioneer. At the top of the list were complaints
that there were too few UAV systems and the equipment to support them was too
cumbersome to be moved easily [Ref. 10:p. 44]. Throughout both Desert Shield and
Desert Storm, UAVs averaged a sortie rate of only 13.25 sorties per vehicle. Marine
aviators flying close air support and battlefield air interdiction operations (CAS/BA1)
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missions were not able to capitalize on UAV information because it was out of date by
the time it reached them [Ref. ll:p. 59].
During the war, the U.S. Air Force could muster only 1.5 squadrons of RF-
4Cs from reserve-component units. A few weeks after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait,
Marine Corps RF-4Bs were decommissioned. Due to the shortages, manned
reconnaissance aircraft were assigned as many as 30 targets in a single mission - the
norm is four or five [Ref. 12:p. 38].
C. SUMMARY
The employment of UAVs in twentieth century military operations has a long and
varied history. Since the 1960's they have been particularly useful in performing covert
missions against targets where airframe survivability is questionable.
Had Teledyne Ryan's Buffalo Hunter reconnaissance drones been equipped with
electronic data links, their intelligence data would have been more timely. An infrared
capability would have allowed reconnaissance missions to be flown at night thereby
minimizing UAV vulnerability and increasing the availability of reconnaissance
missions. Additionally, these UAVs were not equipped with a navigation system that
could accurately place the aircraft over the intended target area [Ref. 13].
Israeli operations in the Bekaa Valley demonstrated for the first time the
versatility of such a platform in a hostile environment and the tactical significance of
proper employment of these platforms and timely dissemination of UAV intelligence
data.
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Anti-guerrilla operations in Honduras, while confirming the usefulness of
electronic data links, demonstrated that line-of-sight command and control equipment
are ineffective in mountainous regions where mission profiles are flown at low altitudes
to enhance imagery resolution. Additionally, when infrared or visual sensors are the
sole or primary search sensors, the cuing data required to plan Reconnaissance,
Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) missions must be accurate enough to fly
the UAV to the target's approximate location. In order to accomplish this, accurate
navigational equipment and timely coordination with national sensors is required.
Missions employing optical sensors are better suited to immobile targets such as
command bunkers.
Desert Storm proved to be the culmination of thirty years of American UAV
research and development. Forty Pioneer UAVs deployed to South West Asia from 16
January to 27 February flew over 1680 flight hours in 530 sorties with a 5% combat
loss rate. An additional fourteen air vehicles were damaged during the Gulf War as a
result of operator error, engine/airframe failure, gunfire, and electromagnetic
interference [Ref. 14:p. 106].
Organic manned surveillance aircraft may not always be available to the Strike
Warfare Commander (STWC) or Anti-Surface Warfare Commander (ASUWC), as
indicated by the recent deployment of the USS Theodore Roosevelt without S-3Bs and
their Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR). RSTA missions may not always be
flown against only relatively fixed targets. Future missions may be planned to search
relatively large areas against mobile targets. For such missions accurate cuing data may
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not be available and therefore, infrared sensors may not prove adequate as the primary
search sensor. Wide area surveillance sensors such as radar and electronic support
measures (ESM) will be required if full area coverage is to remain the mission
planner's goal.
Incorporation of improved sensors and electronic data links can enhance UAV
RSTA mission success. Future UAVs must be capable of successfully searching an
area for enemy targets, whether they be designated targets of interest or targets of
opportunity. Inclusion of an infrared imaging sensor will allow the UAV to covertly
identify contacts while an imaging radar will allow the system to do so from a safe
distance outside the envelope of the target's weapon systems.
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II. MISSIONS
Future generations of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) will be required to
provide near real-time Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
support to include Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) to tactical commanders day or
night and in periods of inclement weather. The system will incorporate the concept
of modular mission payloads. Only those sensors required to perform the immediate
task will be carried by the UAV. Electro-optical (EO) sensors are the chosen
sensors for the baseline version UAV.
Follow-on growth missions include Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS),
Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) and Anti-ship Missile Defense (ASMD). With
these growth missions comes newer sensor systems to be carried by the UAV as the
need arises.
This chapter presents an overview of the baseline RSTA mission scenario. A
cued area search in littoral waters is used to show the dilemma faced by mission
planners when tasked to plan RSTA missions with limited sensor payload support.
A. OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW
The primary purpose of the UAV in a normal RSTA mission is to extend the
effective ranges of a ship's weapons and sensor systems. As a force multiplier, they
will increase the number of air assets available to a ship, giving the ship's
Commanding Officer the capability to search a broader area around his platform
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thereby focusing his own ship's firepower directly in the area of interest. This will
enable him to act more independently of search assets requiring long and uncertain
tasking cycles.
UAVs will allow ships without organic air assets such as the Arleigh Burke
class DDG-5 1 , which will be the main component of future surface forces, to
perform long range RSTA missions independently of other units. This could include
long duration barrier operations in littoral regions. Even those ships with an organic
helicopter onboard will be able to generate accurate situation and targeting data
against multiple threats simultaneously using both the UAV and its LAMPS
helicopter, thereby increasing the size of its radius of influence. The UAV could
also act as a targeting platform for armed LAMPS helicopter strikes against small
gunboats and combatants.
B. RSTA MISSION
The factors effecting the success of RSTA missions include, but are not limited
to, availability, accuracy and timeliness of cuing data, target mobility and proximity
to the UAV launch platform, threat condition and the size of the area to be searched
with the sensors available. Active sensors such as radar provide the search platform
with a means of effectively covering a large area in relatively short time due to its
increased range over conventional optical sensors. However, because they are active,
these sensors act as beacons to any hostile unit in the vicinity of the assigned search
area. Passive sensors such as infrared (IR) and electronic support measures (ESM)
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enable the air vehicle to assume a covert posture. Due to the shorter ranges of IR
compared to radar, and the fact that ESM requires a willing cooperative target to
activate its emitters, the time required to search an area of uncertainty (AOU) using
passive sensors is considerably greater than that of active sensors.
Accuracy of the target data base and threat condition are factors which effect
the choice of sensor to be employed throughout the search phase of the mission as
discussed below.
1. Fixed Targets
When the approximate locations of targets are known, the mission can be
planned to image limited areas of interest. These might include airfields, lines of
communication, or any fixed area where pre-strike intelligence is required. Missions
planned against such targets are well suited for optical sensors, especially when a
covert posture is required prior to the arrival of strike aircraft.
2. Cued Search
Collateral information from other intelligence sources may be used to cue
the UAV and to limit the size of the search area. An ESM system collocated with
an onboard imaging sensor provides a powerful combination for detecting and
accurately locating emitting targets, as well as providing situation awareness.
Accuracy of the cuing data and size of the AOU play a major role in determining
the primary search sensor.
19
3. Area Search
The area search method is employed when the target area is not defined
due to lack of pertinent cuing information. The search consists of parallel and
slightly overlapping tracks, and continues until a target is imaged or until the
assigned area is covered. Although time-consuming, this type of area search
provides a reference data base for use in follow-on mission planning.
4. Targeting and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)
UAVs are a natural choice for assignment as stand-off targeting aircraft
(SOTA). During conflict, mobile targets present a difficult targeting problem,
especially during periods of inclement weather and in areas consisting of formidable
terrain. When these conditions are encountered, accurate target position and status
cannot be determined using conventional imaging sensors such as IR. ESM systems
may indicate the presence of mobile air defenses accompanying enemy forces, but
provide only approximate locations.
Moving Target Indicator (MTI) radars can indicate speed and direction,
but alone are not sufficient to allow a complete analysis of the enemy's force
structure, to include electronic order of battle (EOB) and force composition. Once
targets cease moving, other sensors must be employed to provide intelligence data.
One such sensor which proves ideal for this situation would be an imaging radar
such as Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) or Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar
(ISAR). The UAV could be cued by its onboard ESM sensor to relative target
position, targets localized by the MTI radar, and the high resolution capabilities of
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the imaging radar can determine how the units are deployed, locate them accurately,
and supply this information for targeting to a strike package, even in inclement
weather. The UAV could then loiter over the target area providing battle damage
assessment through the use of its onboard optical sensors.
C. MISSION SCENARIO
Naval forces deploy as part of a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG), normally
composed of a mix of cruisers, destroyers, frigates and support ships in addition to
the carrier and its embarked air wing, and totalling as many as eleven ships.
Initially, UAVs will be embarked in Spruance (DD-963) and Arleigh Burke (DDG-
51) destroyers. Most likely scenarios in which the UAV would play a vital role
involve Surface Action Group (SAG) operations without the support of a carrier.
In the past, SAGs have been supported by land-based Maritime Patrol Aircraft
(MPA). However, with the recent reduction in the number of MPA squadrons and
overseas deployment sites, this valuable RSTA asset may not be available to the
SAG commander during future conflicts. The SAG commander needs an organic
RSTA asset to be aware of activities in his battle space.
By far the most difficult RSTA mission which the SAG commander will be
forced to plan and execute is that which is based on poorly defined or inaccurate
cuing data - the broad area search. Certain non-organic cuing systems such as High
Frequency Direction Finding (HFDF) nets produce large AOUs. As the size of the
AOU increases, so does the time required to cover 1 00 per cent of the area. The
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most common AOU inaccuracy faced by mission planners is caused by time-late
intelligence data. For instance, a five hour old AOU with a semi-major axis of 15
nm and a semi-minor axis of 10 nm is received by the SAG commander from the
Anti-Surface Warfare Commander (ASUWC) along with tasking to search the area
with a coverage factor of 1.25. The center of the area is approximately 60 nm from
the SAG and target speed is estimated to be 15 kts. This translates to a search area
with semi-major axis of 90 nm and semi-minor axis of 85 nm. This combination of
inaccuracy in cuing data and large AOU size can place a strain on RSTA asset
availability.
The broad area search mission is discussed below for two cases: (i) a UAV
equipped solely with an optical sensor, and (ii) a UAV equipped with a multi-sensor
payload consisting of radar, ESM and IR systems. The first case was chosen
because current planning for the baseline version of the next generation of UAV is
to employ the concept of the modular mission payload. That is, the UAV will only
carry a single sensor system, primarily electro-optical (EO), during RSTA missions.
Should the assigned mission dictate the use of another sensor, for example radar, it
will be necessary to swap payloads on deck either before or between missions.
The second case is based on the author's operational experience as a Tactical
Coordinator in Maritime Patrol Aircraft, a mission planner on a Patrol Wing Staff
and as ASUWC for a CVBG in the Mediterranean and Red Seas during Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Its purpose is to compare onstation area coverage
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between the modular mission payload and a multi-sensor payload such as those
currently employed by manned RSTA assets.
1. Scenario
A CVBG has been operating in the Mediterranean Sea for the past five
months and has detached a two ship SAG to operate in a littoral region in the
vicinity of a small island chain where terrorist gunboat activity has been reported by
counter-intelligence sources. These gunboats are believed to be equipped with
Soviet-made surface search radars, hand-held Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs), small
caliber anti-aircraft guns and grenade launchers. It is believed that they could
conduct operations against SAG units either as one or in formations of as many as
five units.
The ASUWC has passed an elliptical AOU with a semi-major axis of 50
nautical miles (run) and a semi-minor axis of 30 nm to the SAG commander in
which several gunboats are believed to be operating. Time-late on the locating data
is one hour. When plotted, a large portion of the ellipse is located over land and
within territorial standoffs of littoral nations. The mission planner has determined a
20 x 20 nm box located 30 nm to the north of the SAG's present position to hold
the best prospects for detecting any possible gunboat activity.
Shipboard environmental prediction systems indicate an IR range of four
nm and a radar range of 27.5 nm against a gunboat-size target. To minimize
counter-detection, the assigned search altitude is 500 ft. ESM ranges at this altitude
are predicted to be 41.25 nm (1.5 x 1.23 x (radar height)''*). A standard ladder
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search is assigned at a search speed of 60 knots (kts) to allow increased onstation
endurance, high probability of detection and low false alarm rate in haze and traffic.
Predicted onstation surface winds are from the west at 20 kts and a cloud layer
exists at 1000 ft. A coverage factor of 1.25 is to be used to ensure 100 per cent
coverage of the area with some overlap of the imaging swath. Coverage factor is
defined as sweep width / track spacing, where sweep width is the predicted detection
range of the search sensor.
The modular mission payload employed in the first case will consist
solely of IR. In the second case, a multi-sensor payload consisting of MTI and
SAR radars, and IR and ESM systems will be used to cover the same area. For the
purposes of this thesis, the goal is 1 00 per cent coverage of the assigned area.
a. Optical Sensor Search
With a predicted IR detection range of four nm against a gunboat-
size target, the resulting track spacing for a coverage factor of 1 .25 is three nm.
With westerly winds at 20 kts, the initial leg of the search pattern is 3 nm inside the
eastern-most side of the assigned search area flown from south to north in order to
minimize sea return. The IR sensor will search an area 45 degrees either side of the
nose of the UAV. A track spacing of three nm results in seven south-north legs and
six east-west legs with a total of 158 nm which must be transited by the UAV in
order to cover the entire area. Flown at a search speed of 60 kts, the UAV will
require 2 hrs 38 min to image the entire assigned area.
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Should any contacts of interest be detected, the UAV will be
required to fly off track and image the contact. This results in an increased time
onstation and, depending on available fuel and distance to the controlling platform, a
follow-on UAV flight may be required or a second UAV tasked to be onstation
simultaneously with the first. If contacts in the area should activate their surface
search radars, the UAV, assumed here to be without an ESM system, will be
incapable of detecting such emissions. An ESM system could greatly reduce the
amount of time required for the UAV to search the area provided the target is
cooperative and radiates its emitters while the UAV is in the vicinity of the search
area. If the UAV were equipped with such a system and threat emitters detected,
the UAV could be programmed to continue on track in an attempt to triangulate the
source or turn and fly down the threat bearing searching with its onboard IR system,
until the contact is identified. Normally, an appropriate distance to fly along the
emitter bearing is approximately 1.5 times the predicted ESM horizon at the
assigned search altitude in order to account for the possibility of any ducting of
radiated energy.
b. Multi-Sensor Search
In a multi-sensor search scenario, MTI radar is the primary search
sensor, even in the situation when the search asset is a manned aircraft such as
MPA. The normal progression of events is a ladder search flown as described above
with a track spacing normally set at 12 nm and the MTI radar pointed down wind
(easterly in this scenario) in order to minimize sea return and clutter. Radar contacts
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are then imaged with the onboard SAR system, taking advantage of its increased
standoff capability over IR. This ensures that the air vehicle does not overfly and
alert the contact of interest or come within the range of the targets onboard weapons
systems. Should further investigation be warranted, a fly over may be performed
and the contact imaged using the onboard IR sensor.
At the same time that radar is searching downwind, IR is
programmed to search off the nose of the UAV in order to detect and identify any
contacts of interest along the flight path. Additionally, these contacts will be stored
in the track data base and correlated with radar contacts gained by the UAV on
following tracks, reducing the time required to image contacts. The amount of time
required to cover the entire area in this case is 52 min.
Once again, an ESM system would greatly reduce the amount of
time required to search for and detect contacts of interest in the presence of threat
emitters. The search tactics would remain the same as described in the previous
section with the exception that the mission commander now has the option of
radiating the UAV's onboard radar system along the threat bearing in an attempt to
locate the source of emissions more quickly.
The theoretical radar horizon for an emitter searching at an altitude
of 500 ft is 27.5 nm. The diagonal of the assigned search area is approximately
28.28 nm. In this scenario, the UAV would be capable of radiating over virtually
the entire area from the southwest corner of the area with the onboard MTI radar.
From this position, any contacts gained in the area could then be imaged with the
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UAVs onboard SAR, or with the onboard IR system. Regardless, positioning the
UAV in the southwest corner of the search area allows the entire area to be covered
in a very short time, and contacts imaged and identified. The UAV may be used for
any follow-on tasking such as identifying contacts in the general vicinity of the
controlling platform.
c. Conclusions
Employment of the UAV under both cases in the above scenario
provides complete coverage of the entire area. However, in the case where IR was
the sole sensor, if the gunboat transiting the western portion of the assigned search
area heading in any direction other than easterly when the UAV arrived onstation, it
might have been outside the assigned area by the time the UAV had completed
tasking. The UAV equipped with the multiple sensor payload in which the MTI
radar was the primary sensor could have conducted a surface plot of all contacts
from the western side of the box and imaged contacts from west to east accordingly.
In both cases the entire area is covered, but the UAV equipped with a multiple
sensor payload has a better chance of preventing contacts from escaping detection
and identification.
Assuming a ladder search is to be performed in the scenario's 20 nm
x 20 nm box, the UAV equipped with the multiple sensor payload completed
coverage of the entire area in less than one-third the time required by the UAV
equipped with just the IR sensor. When applied to searches of larger areas, it is
readily apparent that the UAV equipped with the multiple sensor payload is more
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capable of providing timely coverage and a broader extension of the host-ship's
weapons and sensor systems and, ultimately, its sphere of influence.
D. SUMMARY
RSTA missions provide a SAG commander with valuable information
concerning enemy surface activity within his area of responsibility. It allows him to
keep abreast of changes in an enemy's force structure and bring his own forces to
bear on threat sectors of immediate concern to him. Such missions may be tasked
against fixed or mobile targets regardless of the availability or accuracy of cuing
data.
As the military shrinks in size, so does the availability of manned RSTA assets
and UAVs become an attractive alternative. Future UAVs will employ the modular
mission payload concept. Only an EO sensor is to be carried onboard the baseline
UAV employed in RSTA missions with later versions capable of supporting radars,
ESM and IR modular payload combinations. Sensor systems will be swapped prior
to each mission as dictated by the mission environment.
The most difficult task faced by a mission planner is one where inaccurate
cuing data covering a broad area is the only data with which to work. Of the
possible inaccuracies associated with cuing systems, the most common are those
associated with timeliness of the data and target motion. Time-late data and a fast
target translate to a larger AOU.
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In the case of the UAV equipped with a modular mission payload where EO is
the sole sensor, as the size of the AOU increases, so does the time required to
provide 100 per cent area coverage. Target detection now becomes a question of
target speed and location relative to the UAV and availability of follow-on assets.
Conversely, a UAV equipped with multiple sensors such as MTI, SAR, ESM
and IR can cover the entire area in a fraction of the time required by the UAV
equipped with a single optical sensor. This leaves more time available for target
identification and classification, and frees the UAV to perform secondary missions if
time and fuel permit. A UAV equipped with such a sensor suite is more capable of
providing the SAG commander with timely area coverage, valuable situational
awareness and a broader extension of the SAG's weapons and sensor systems and,
ultimately, it's sphere of influence.
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III. MULTIPLE SENSOR PAYLOADS
Military actions conducted in the past decade in Central America and the
Middle East have shown the importance of having available timely intelligence to
support Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) missions
without risk to manned aircraft and the potential for loss of life or the possibility of
prisoners of war.
The increasing capabilities of surface-to-air (SAMs) and air-to-air (AAMs)
missiles and the continued unrestricted proliferation of these systems throughout the
Third World could produce significant attrition of U.S. aircraft in future conflicts.
When reconnaissance or attack sorties are flown near or over heavily defended target
areas, they are likely to be engaged by various types of missiles and/or AAA
weapons. Although intelligence information can be gathered by reconnaissance
satellites and manned aircraft such as F-14 aircraft employing Tactical Aerial
Reconnaissance Pods (TARPS) or S-3B aircraft equipped with Inverse Synthetic
Aperture Radar (ISAR), delays in the tasking and/or data dissemination of these
systems are inevitable. Such delays may be the result of command and control
deficiencies or by an individual command's position on the intelligence priority and
data dissemination ladder. Satellite imagery is processed by intelligence facilities
ashore prior to being disseminated to the commander of the carrier battlegroup
(CVBG). TARPS imagery requires postflight processing and analysis. Unless the
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onstation S-3B is providing direct support to an individual ship or surface action
group (SAG) as a stand-off targeting aircraft (SOTA), analysis of ISAR imagery
may not be available to individual units of the CVBG until after the aircraft has
returned to the carrier and mission tapes analyzed. UAVs can act as an extension of
an individual ship's weapons and sensor systems providing timely intelligence to the
controlling platform. They can be used to pinpoint and verify potential targets
identified by both national and non-organic sensors and perform Battle Damage
Assessment (BDA) as required. A UAV tactical reconnaissance system tasked by
tactical commanders could be used to penetrate heavily defended enemy positions,
collect imagery data, and disseminate this data to other battle force assets
expeditiously.
The ability of UAVs to perform reconnaissance missions over enemy territory
provides the Strike Warfare Commander (STWC), the Anti-Surface Warfare
Commander (ASUWC) and the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) with
the intelligence data required to take timely action against enemy forces. These
same reconnaissance UAVs can provide detailed imagery of individual formations
and also perform targeting functions for incoming strikes, harass enemy command,
control and communications facilities, carry out jamming and other electronic
warfare (EW) missions, gather and transmit signals intelligence (SIGINT) and
provide communications relay capabilities and BDA.
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A. PAYLOADS
The primary UAV serving the American military forces today is the Pioneer
system. Equipped with an electronic data link and a Forward Looking Infrared
(FLIR) camera, it is best suited for performing gunfire support missions and
searching small areas where the target's position is accurately known. In its present
configuration, it is ill-equipped to perform effective RSTA missions against either a
moving target or a stationary target believed to be located within a large area of
uncertainty (AOU). In scenarios of high merchant shipping density and
environmental clutter, the Pioneer system in service today would be overwhelmed
when tasked to search for and detect a specific individual target in a large AOU in a
timely fashion.
To be effective, the next generation UAV must be capable of performing in all
five stages of a RSTA mission: over-the-horizon search, detection, classification,
targeting and battle damage assessment. To achieve greater imagery resolution, the
UAV will be operating at lower altitudes. Therefore, it must be equipped with an
electronic data link system capable of transmitting video, radar imagery and
electronics intelligence (ELINT) over great distances and in mountainous regions.
Infrared (IR) or radar imagery provides 24-hour coverage of the battlefield,
regardless of environmental conditions. An infrared camera can identify both fixed
and moving targets even at night and in the presence of limited battlefield
obstructions. A Moving Target Indication (MTI) radar can search for, detect and
acquire moving targets with a high degree of accuracy over a wide area. It provides
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the tactical commander with the most comprehensive information about threats that
are of the most immediate concern to him. An MTI radar can also cue an infrared
camera, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) or Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar
(ISAR), enabling them to identify targets more accurately. SAR and ISAR are
particularly useful in identifying targets in the presence of heavy battlefield
obscuration such as smoke or humidity, which degrades the performance of standard
optical sensors. Those targets which are of the highest value will be located near
command and control facilities. Electronic Support Measures (ESM) systems can
detect electromagnetic emissions beyond the radar horizon, and can alert an operator
to the presence and location of both search and fire-control radars before the aircraft
enters the missile or gun engagement zones. A sensor package consisting of radar,
ESM and IR sensors can greatly reduce the amount of time required to search a
specific AOU than just IR alone. Electronic Warfare (EW) modules such as
jammers or decoys could enable the UAV to react to threat emitters when operating
in concert with an ESM receiver. A day-time TV system or Low-Light Level TV
(LLLTV) would provide greater resolution than conventional IR systems. This
capability would enable system operators to read ship names during identification
fly-bys - a capability presently lacking in current IR technology.
As described above, sensor systems which could be employed in a RSTA
mission are shown in Table 1 [Ref. 15:pp. 79-102].
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Table 1 PAYLOAD TYPES














A discussion of payload types currently under consideration for employment onboard
future generations of UAVs follows.
1. Electronic Data Link Systems
One of the main deficiencies of the Buffalo Hunter system that was
identified after the Vietnam War was the system's lack of a data link system and its
inability to process imagery near real-time [Ref. 13]. This shortcoming was
corrected by the time Skyeye anti-guerilla reconnaissance missions were being flown
in Honduras in 1984. However, the line-of -sight data link systems employed
performed poorly in mountainous regions when low-altitude mission profiles were
required to enhance imagery resolution.
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Data links to be employed onboard future UAVs must be capable of
performing in increasingly hostile electromagnetic threat environments. They must
be capable of interoperability with other battlefield Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence (C3I) systems in addition to transmitting
intelligence data throughout the entire spectrum of possible mission areas envisioned
[Ref. 15:p. 73].
Presently, the UAV Joint Project Office is considering the AN/SRQ-4
data link system which is compatible with systems presently fielded onboard ships
configured for SH-60B LAMPS helicopters. The SRQ-4 system produced by Lucas
was specifically developed for use onboard manned aircraft and is therefore of
considerable size and weight. Other data link systems presently available are the
Low Cost Common Data Link (LCCDL) produced by Paramax, and PIXLINK
produced by McDonnell Douglas. Both are much smaller in size than the SRQ-4
system. Both systems are capable of transmitting imagery and Synthetic Aperture
Radar (SAR) data.
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Table 2 shows the weight, volume and power consumption for all three
systems [Ref. 16:p. 1038].
Table 2 DATA LINKS
MANUFACTURER WEIGHT VOLUME POWER
LUCAS 79.4 lb 1.0000 ft 3 150 W
MCDONNELL
DOUGLAS
27.5 lb 0.5300 ft 3 300 W
PARAMAX 18.1 lb 0.4697 ft3 80 W
The inclusion of a data link system as a integral part of the payload suite reflects the
need for positive command and control of an airborne UAV system. It has the
highest priority of all payloads presently under consideration.
2. Radar Systems
a. Moving Target Indicator (MTI) Radar
A Moving Target Indication (MTI) radar system is one that is
designed to reject fixed targets and pass moving targets on the basis of their doppler
shifts. Most surface and airborne radar systems operate in an environment where
clutter return obscures targets of interest. MTI systems comprise the most widely
used class of radar processors for detecting moving targets in a background of
clutter. If the target is moving relative to the clutter it is possible to filter out the
undesired clutter return by exploiting the differential doppler frequency shift
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produced by the relative target to clutter radial motion. MTI radars are extremely
useful as the initial detection sensor and for displaying an enemy's force disposition.
b. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) development began in the late
1950's to meet the requirement for an all-weather, day-or-night sensor that could
produce high-quality reconnaissance imagery in adverse weather and visibility
conditions. Darkness, rain, smoke, fog, dust or haze have negligible effects on the
imagery produced by a SAR system.
SAR gives essentially constant resolution in the along-track direction
at all range intervals. The along-track resolution of a conventional radar is equal to
the beamwidth of the antenna. Increasing the antenna length to a size that provides
good imaging performance is not practical because such an antenna would be too
large to be carried on an airborne platform. The moving antenna size "synthetically"
appears to be longer than is actually the case, from whence the synthetic-aperture
technique derives its name.
The transmitted pulses are referenced to a standard frequency within
the radar system, and the pulse-to-pulse phase relationship of the target is stored as
it passes through the radar beam, producing a phase history during the target
illumination interval. Employing the same digital processing techniques used to
compress the long range pulses, the target phase history can be compressed,
replicating the target. The effect produces a constant size target resolution cell,
independent of range. The antenna for SAR is relatively small which provides a
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wide beam so that the targets may be illuminated for a longer period of time. The
longer the target is illuminated (the more samples taken) the longer the synthetic
aperture, and the higher the resultant resolution. Effective antenna lengths of
hundreds of thousands of feet can be generated synthetically.
Though SAR systems are best utilized against stationary targets, they
have performed remarkably well against ships at sea [Ref. 17:p. 207].
Figure 4 SAR imagery of a commercial
cargo ship [Ref 17:p. 215].
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c. Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR)
In the mid- 1 960' s Massachusetts Institute of Technology extended
the SAR concept to moving targets by using a variation of the SAR technique called
Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR). The ISAR technique is dependent upon
the target motion rather than the radar platform motion. Production of the ISAR
image is achieved by analyzing two different interactions of the radar energy with
the target. The intersections are in the horizontal and vertical directions of target
motion.
ISAR images are similar in quality to poor video images. This poor
quality is due to the oscillatory motion of the target which causes the image to
stretch in crossrange (ie: vertical direction) as the target accelerates as a result of
pitch, roll and yaw motions. As motion in this pitch, roll, yaw cycle slows and
reverses in direction the image shrinks in crossrange and as a consequence inverts
itself. Image quality can be improved through image resolution control.
ISAR has the ability to track targets in the same manner as an MTI
system when operating in the Planned Position Indicator (PPI) mode. In the PPI
mode, the operator views a series of blips on the radar screen which indicate target
location in range and bearing from the radar antenna. When operation is shifted to
the imaging mode, ISAR performs as described above. Extensive training and
experience is required for an operator to become proficient at ISAR imagery
interpretation.
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Table 3 shows the weight, volume, power consumption and detection
capabilities of available MTI and SAR radar systems [Ref. 15:p. 89].





































67.9 lbs 1.48 ft 3 360 W
The above systems reflect both SAR and MTI systems for which data was
available. Most MTI systems were developed for manned aircraft use and are
therefore larger in weight and volume than those designed specifically for UAV
missions. Both SAR systems, however, were designed specifically for use as UAV
payloads.
40
3. Electronic Support Measures (ESM)
As demonstrated by the Israelis in the Bekaa Valley, collection and
analysis of an enemy's electromagnetic emissions can provide a wealth of
information concerning tactics and capabilities. This function of electronic warfare
(EW) is generally referred to as electronic support measures (ESM), and includes
both communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT).
ESM provides information in a timely fashion and in forms that are readily usable
by the users it supports. An ESM system is employed primarily to passively detect
and identify radar emissions with established signal parameters. In performing this
function, an ESM receiver could be extremely valuable during tactical
reconnaissance missions in such an environment.
On a tactical level, ESM can provide an evaluation of each
electronically-controlled weapon system's capability, while on a strategic level, it
can give an indication of the numbers and different types of electronically-controlled
weapons systems deployed (the Electronic Order of Battle (EOB)). The Israeli
Bekaa Valley Campaign clearly demonstrated the need for control of the electro-
magnetic spectrum and the possible payoff of electronic intelligence.
Table 4 shows the weight, volume, power consumption and the capability
of available ESM systems [Ref. 15:p. 91].
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Table 4 ESM SYSTEMS
NAME
/MANUFACTURER
TYPE WEIGHT SIZE POWER
MEDFLI
/ESL















36 lbs .42ft3 137 W
The above systems give an airborne UAV the capability of detecting radar emissions
in the target area. Growth missions may include L communications Intelligence
(COMINT) and Proforma. The considerable size and power consumption of the
available ESM systems reflect technological advances in miniaturization. Systems of
small weight and volume are specifically designed as UAV payloads.
4. Infrared Systems
The ability to see in the dark is a basic military requirement. The
possibility of achieving this with a completely passive system, which does not
advertise its presence has always been the ultimate objective. Two such sensor
systems exist which perform this task quite well - Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR)
and Infrared Line Scanners (IRLS).
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a. Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR)
FLIR sensors convert infrared energy to the visual spectrum in real
time. Because of the lack of shadows, they are incapable of providing three-
dimensional contour information. They are, however, capable of detecting large
contacts at long ranges provided there is a sufficient difference between the contact
and background temperatures [Ref. 15:p. 81].
Table 5 shows the weight, volume, power consumption and fields of
view of available FLIR systems [Ref. 15:p. 82]. Fields of view (FOV) are included
for each system.
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Table 5 FLIR SYSTEMS
NAME
/MANUFACTURER




















75 lbs 1.78 ft 3 300 W

















































104 lbs 3.43 ft 3 150 W
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Flir systems are heavy and consume large amounts of electrical power due to their
lens and camera cooling requirements. Three such systems (PRSI, IRTV-445G, HP-
FLIR), however, were designed specifically as UAV sensors and therefore reflect the
requirement for installation in a small payload cavity with limited available electrical
power.
b. Infrared Line Scanners (IRLS)
Much like the FLIR, the IRLS provides high resolution imagery of
contacts by passively converting infrared energy to the visual spectrum in real time.
However, IRLS sensors do so over a much wider field of view and higher resolution
than its FLIR counterpart. Because IRLS covers a wider field of view than FLIR, it
is able to cover a larger area. However, in order to transmit this imagery to a
controlling unit over conventional data links available today, a much wider
bandwidth is required and large quantities of imagery can exceed the capabilities of
current data link systems [Ref. 15:p. 84].
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120x60 deg 244.0 lbs 5.90 ft3 651 W
D-5 RC/SEU-A
/HONEYWELL
120x60 deg 208.0 lbs 5.00 ft3 795 W
D-500
/HONEYWELL
120x60 deg 164.0 lbs 6.90 ft3 650 W
ATARS
/LORAL
140x70 deg 76.0 lbs 1.80 ft3 400 W
ATARS/SEU-A
/LORAL
140x70 deg 144.3 lbs 3.70 ft3 545 W
MINI IRLS
/LORAL
180 deg 15.0 lbs 0.20 ft3 65 W
RPV-800
/TX INSTRUMENTS
150 deg 30.0 lbs 0.60 cu ft 200 W
AMIDARS
/CAI
60x120 deg 65.0 lbs 3.67 cu ft 600 W
BARR & STROUD 100 deg 15.0 lbs 0.39 ft 3 250 W
VINTEN 4000 180 deg 44.0 lbs 0.46 ft 3 256 W
VINTEN 180 deg 29.0 lbs 0.46 ft 3 250 W
Table 6 shows the weight, volume and power restrictions of available IRLS systems
[Ref. 15:pp. 82].
Like FLIR, IRLS systems are heavy and consume large amounts of
electrical power due to their lens and camera cooling requirements. One system
(MINI IRLS), however, were designed specifically as UAV sensors and therefore
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reflects the requirement for installation in a small payload cavity with limited
available electrical power.
B. SUMMARY
Tactical warfare commanders require accurate and timely intelligence data in
order to counter an enemy's movements. With the proliferation of advanced
technology weapons systems throughout the world's littoral regions, Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have become a more attractive alternative to manned
reconnaissance. Infrared sensors alone will not adequately perform RSTA missions
in a high threat environment where large areas are to be expeditiously searched.
Radar systems on the other hand can cover large areas but, as an active sensor, will
cue enemy installations to any allied search effort. In order to respond to any
possible active enemy emitters, ESM equipment must be collocated with other
sensors onboard the surveillance platform. Therefore, in order to be an effective
search asset on the modern battlefield, the next generation UAV must be equipped
with a payload which maximizes survivability and time on station. That payload is
a combination of active and passive sensors.
A high resolution imaging radar, can detect, locate, and classify tactical targets.
It is particularly effective in situations where conventional imaging sensors (ie:,
infrared) are not, such as in adverse weather conditions and areas where targets may
be obscured by dust, smoke and chemical clouds most likely to exist over a
battlefield. Additionally, foliage penetration capabilities at longer wavelengths make
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the imaging radar particularly desirable in areas of dense foliage. The increased
ranges of these sensors over conventional systems under adverse environmental
conditions permit standoff surveillance and targeting.
As shown in Chapter II, employing a radar as the initial detection sensor
provides an enhanced capability to locate and identify re-deployable targets before
they are alerted to move or their organic weapons systems are brought on-line.
Additionally, a radar system as the primary sensor may force enemy air defense
systems (ie:, air search and fire control radars) to become active which will provide
additional intelligence and locational data and assist in contact identification if an
ESM system is included in the UAV sensor suite. The radar can then be cued to the
approximate target area, targets verified, and accurately located. Critical contacts of
interest can then be handed off to onboard optical sensors. This second onboard
sensor would likely require a much closer flight path and could alert the target area.
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IV. UAV PAYLOAD SELECTION MODEL
A. MODEL DESCRIPTION AND FORMULATION
UAV PAYLOAD SELECTION MODEL, an optimization model capable of
selecting a multiple sensor payload to fit an individual UAV payload cavity, is
formulated as a mixed integer linear program. The model is an extension of the
traditional knapsack problem [Ref. 18:p. 13]. A description of the knapsack
problem in the current context is as follows: given a set of n items (sensors) and a
knapsack (payload cavity) with
Uj = the value or utility of item (sensor) j,
Wj = the weight of item (sensor) j,
c = the payload carrying capacity of the knapsack (payload cavity),







where Xj is a decision variable defined as:
Xj = one if item j is selected and zero otherwise.
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This is referred to as the - 1 knapsack problem because each item must be
either selected or omitted; the model will not select a fractional portion of an item or
take an item more than once. Our extension of this traditional model is developed
in the next section.
B. UAV PAYLOAD SELECTION MODEL
The goal of the UAV PAYLOAD SELECTION MODEL is to provide a
sensor mix to be carried onboard the next generation of UAVs that will maximize
the platform's on-station performance while employed in Reconnaissance,
Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) missions. The mathematical
formulation is presented below after the introduction of appropriate notation.
Section C provides a detailed description of the model's mathematical constraints.
1. Indices
The following indices are used throughout the model. They define a
specific sensor system by both its type and manufacturer.
j = specific sensor system types;
k = sensor manufacturers
Values of the indices used in runs of the model to date are:
j g {MTI (Moving Target Indicator), SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar),
ELINT (Electronic Intelligence), ESM (Electronic Support
Measures), FLIR (Forward Looking Infrared), IRLS (Infrared Line
Scanners), DL (Electronic Data Link)};
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k g {Harry Diamond Labs, AIL, Lockheed, Lincoln Labs, Loral, ESL, IBM,
E Systems, Dalmo Victor, Westinghouse, Kollmorgen, Hughes,
Inframetrics, Plinkington, Honeywell, Texas Instruments, Tadiran,
Barr & Stroud, CAI, Vinten, Lucas, McDonnell Douglas, Paramax, IAI,
FMPS}.
The index values chosen are an input to the model which can be
changed in future runs.
2. Data
The following data are the required inputs to the optimum model.
Tot-Wt = total payload capacity of UAV system measured in pounds;
Tot-Vol = total volume of the UAV payload cavity measured in cubic feet;
Tot-Pwr = total power generated by the UAV onboard electrical system
measured in Watts;
Tot-Cost = total budget allowed for purchase of sensor payload;
False-Aim = a weighted value for the maximum allowable number of false
contacts measured over time;
MTI-ID = a weighted value for the minimum allowable identification value of
MTI radar systems;
Ujk = utility value from to 1 assigned to system type j;
Wjk = weight of system type j as claimed by manufacturer k, measured in
pounds;
Voljk = volume of system type j as claimed by manufacturer k, measured in
cubic feet;
Pwrjk = amount of electrical power consumed by system type j as claimed by
manufacturer k, measured in watts;
IDjk = a value from to 1 of system j's capability of identifying or
assisting in the identification of a contact of interest.
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Falsejk = a weighted value from to 1 of system j's capability to determine a
target through background clutter;
Costjk = the cost of sensor j as claimed by manufacturer k.
3. Decision Variables
The following binary variables are used throughout the model.
Xjk = a binary variable whose value is one if system type j produced by
manufacturer k is selected for inclusion as part of the onboard payload,
and zero otherwise.
4. Objective Function and Constraints
A mathematical presentation of UAV PAYLOAD SELECTION MODEL




(1) E xJk S 1.0 V j
k
(2) EE Wjk • Xjk , Tot-Wt
j k
0) EE v*b ' h * Tot~ Vo1
j k
(4) EE Pwjk ' xjk * Tot ~Pwr
j *
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(5) ££ ID, Xjk * MTI-ID
J *
(6) Y,H Falsejk ' xjk s False -Aim
J k
(7) ££ Costjk • X;Jfc < 7of-Co5?
The UAV PAYLOAD SELECTION MODEL was written in the General
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) language [Ref. 19] and is included as
Appendix A. Appendix B lists the sets, parameters and sensor data for the model.
The data for which the model was run are those of the Short Range UAV (SR-
UAV) presently under design for the Program Executive Officer for Cruise Missile
Projects and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (PEOCMPUAV). However, the model can
be used for any UAV presently under development. Parameters used in the model
were a gross payload weight of 200 pounds, a payload cavity measuring 1 5 cubic
feet and an electrical system capable of generating 1 000 Watts of electrical power.
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The model chooses from those sensor systems describe in Chapter III:
• Radar - Moving Target Indicator (MTI)
- Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR),
• Electronic Surveillance - Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)
- Electronic Support Measures (ESM),
Infrared - Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR)
- Infrared Line Scanners (IRLS),
• Electronic Data Link (DL).
The model determines the optimum payload based on the utility or perceived
value of the individual sensor in a RSTA mission scenario. Individual sensors are
given a value from zero to one based upon this perceived utility. Utility values were
determined by the author using the method of the analytic hierarchy process (AHP)
and Expert Choice software [Ref. 20]. The method is subjective and relies heavily
on the author's operational experience as both a Patrol Plane Tactical Coordinator
onboard Maritime Patrol Aircraft and as mission planner on Patrol Wing and Battle
Force staffs. Additionally, the model selects a sensor based upon its ability to
positively identify or assist in the identification of a target, its ability to pass false
contacts, and the amount of money available for the purchase of such a sensor
system. Once again, the identification and false contact values range from zero to
one and are subjectively determined through both operational experience and Expert
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Choice software. The author chose to use Expert Choice software because it was
relatively user friendly and readily available. However, weight data obtained from
other methods such as the method of paired comparisons may be used with this
model.
C. CONSTRAINT DESCRIPTION
Constraint (1) ensures only one of each type of sensor system is selected. This
enables the model to select from several different radar systems, but only one
moving target indicator or synthetic aperture radar type in order to avoid duplication
of active sensor capabilities.
Constraints (2) and (3) are the physical constraints of the UAV airframe and,
as such, are restricted by platform design specifications, payload weight and volume,
respectively. Constraint (4) allows all selected sensor systems to be operated
simultaneously without exceeding the maximum power generated by the UAV
electrical system.
Constraints (5) and (6) force the selected sensor system to meet positive
identification requirements. Because earlier generation UAVs carried primarily
electro-optical (EO) sensors, they were capable of positively identifying a contact of
interest provided mission planners received accurate target locating data. Constraint
(5) ensures this capability is carried forward into the next generation of UAV.
Constraint (6) attempts to keep the number of false contacts as low as the combined
sensor payload will permit.
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The last constraint, (7), ensures that the combined payload will remain within
the purchasing budget. Unit cost data used in this thesis are estimates received from
industrial sources, and are used to test the model for completeness. Total system
cost reported with each test result merely demonstrates the effects of the purchasing
budget constraint on the final sensor payload. These are only estimates. A summary
of the data used in this model is provided as Appendix B.
D. THE ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS (AHP)
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was used to determine values for
utility, identification and false alarm weights and is the basis for Expert Choice
software. AHP assumes that the weights on any level or hierarchy can be
determined independently of the other levels. These weights are in fact determined
using a nine-point integer scale (1 to 9) of relative importance for evaluating
pairwise comparisons. These pairwise comparisons were performed on each
individual hierarchy or level. Three levels were compared based on sensor
preference. The first level consisted of sensor categories (ie; Radar, Electronic
Surveillance, etc.); the second level consisted of sensor types (ie; MTI, SAR,
ELINT, etc); and finally, the third level separated each sensor type by manufacturer.
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Table 7 shows the scale used by AHP to aid ratio judgements [Ref. 21].






5 Essential or Strong
7 Very Strong Importance
9 Extreme Importance
2,4,6,8 Intermediate Values
To determine utility values for this thesis, sensor systems were initially ranked
on a hierarchical principle with the first level consisting of sensor categories (i.e.,
Radar, Electronic Surveillance, IR, Data Link). The ranking principle was based on
the author's preference for a particular sensor in a RSTA mission scenario based on
that sensor's ability to cover a large area. The next step was to rank each system
type (i.e., MTI, SAR, ELINT, ESM, FLIR, IRLS). The ranking principle was based
on the author's preference for a particular sensor and it's ability to verify a contact
as a contact of interest. Last of all, individual manufacturer's sensors were ranked
within a sensor type based upon their capabilities (i.e., field of view, detection range,
etc). The aforementioned process was repeated for both identification value and
false alarm rate, based on a sensor's perceived ability to identify or assist in the
identification of a contact of interest and its ability to reject false contacts. Even
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though they are required elements of the final payload package, data link systems
were omitted from these last two rankings because they do not contribute to the
payload' s overall detection capability.
Appendix B contains sensor data previously described in Chapter III (weight,
volume and power consumption). Additionally, utility, identification and false alarm
values derived using Expert Choice software is included. It is imperative that future
UAVs be capable of transmitting imagery data, therefore, data links are given the
highest utility value. Due to their increased detection ranges over IR systems, radars
were ranked second in desirability. SAR systems were given a larger utility value
than MTI systems because of their capability to image contacts. Because of the
higher data rates required to transmit IRLS data, FLIR systems were ranked higher
than IRLS systems. Each IR system was then individually ranked within their
respective category (FLIR, IRLS) based on fields of view. ESM systems were
ranked lowest due to their requirement for a cooperative target.
IR systems were perceived to possess the best identification capability over all
sensor systems considered and, as such, were ranked highest. Of these, FLIR
systems were ranked above IRLS due primarily to their field of view capabilities.
SAR systems were ranked third because of their standoff capabilities, while ESM
systems were ranked fourth because of their requirement for a cooperative emitter.
MTI systems, having limited identification capabilities, were ranked last.
IR systems capable of visual identification were believed to have the lowest
false alarm rates and therefore were given the lowest value. SAR systems are
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capable of providing target imagery, thus enabling the operator to determine if a
contact warrants further investigation with optical sensors. For this reason, SAR
systems were ranked second. Provided the target is employing active radar
emissions, ESM systems are capable of classifying a contact based upon the
parameters of the received signal, and are therefore ranked third. Of the available
sensors, radar systems were believed to have the highest false alarm rates. Primarily
due to background clutter, MTI radars have the highest rate, especially in high sea
states.
Several complaints concerning AHP have been documented, chief among them
that the procedure produces both rank reversal and arbitrary rankings [Ref. 22]. The
ranking determined by the AHP may be altered by the addition or deletion of one or
more alternative sensor systems. These alternatives may be completely unique or a
close match when compared to the previous systems. For instance, sensor systems
were originally ranked in the order Data Link, Radar, IR, and ESM in terms of
desirability. With the addition of a fifth system, a Jammer, systems were ranked as
Radar, IR, Data Link, ESM, and Jammer. Data Link is no longer ranked as the most
desirable system, even though it is imperative that one be included in the final
payload. These arbitrary rankings are produced when the principle of hierarchic
composition is assumed because the scores on each alternai.'ve are normalized. The
fact that these rankings may not be appropriate causes what has become known as
rank reversal.
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Expert Choice software was chosen to assist in the ranking of each sensor
because it was both readily available and user friendly. However, because AHP
provides the basis for Expert Choice software, users should be made aware of
possible inconsistencies in calculated rankings. The author checked the final results
of all rankings using the method of paired comparisons and ensured that they were




Future UAVs will employ the modular mission payload concept. Only an
electro-optical (EO) sensor is to be carried onboard the baseline UAV employed in
RSTA missions with later versions capable of supporting radars, electronic support
measures (ESM) and infrared (IR) modular payload combinations. In general, the
concept is that sensor systems will be swapped prior to each mission as dictated by
the mission environment.
The UAV PAYLOAD SELECTION MODEL was run to determine the
optimum payload under three conditions. The first considered a sensor purchasing
budget of $500,000 and that the AN/SRQ-4, Low Cost Common Data Link
(LCCDL) and PIXLINK were all equally possible competitors for the payload data
link system.
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The results for the first condition are shown in Table 8.











TOTAL SYSTEM WEIGHT: 48.08 lbs
TOTAL SYSTEM VOLUME: 1.08 ft







The AN/SRQ-4 ($1,450,000) was rejected from the final sensor payload because its
inclusion exceeded the $500,000 purchasing budget. In this case, where EO is the
sole sensor, as the size of the area of uncertainty (AOU) increases, so does the time
required to provide 100 per cent area coverage. Target detection now becomes a
question of target speed and location relative to the UAV, availability of follow-on
assets and merchant shipping density in the AOU.
UAVs equipped with EO sensors alone will not adequately perform RSTA
missions in a high threat environment where large areas are to be expeditiously
searched. Radar systems on the other hand can cover large areas but, as an active
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sensor, will cue enemy installations to any allied search effort. In order to respond
to any possible active enemy emitters, ESM equipment must be collocated with
other sensors onboard the surveillance platform. Therefore, in order to be an
effective search asset on the modern battlefield, the next generation UAV must be
equipped with a payload which maximizes survivability and time on station. That
payload is a combination of active and passive sensors.
To that end, conditions two and three were experiments to determine the
optimum multiple sensor payload under two purchasing budget conditions:
$2,500,000 and $5,000,000.
Table 9 displays the results when all three data link systems (AN/SRQ-4, Low Cost
Common Data Link (LCCDL) and PIXLINK) were considered as equally possible
competitors and the purchasing budget set at $2,500,000.
63
Table 9 TEST RESULTS USING $2,500,000 PURCHASING BUDGET






















TOTAL SYSTEM WEIGHT: 197.08 lbs
TOTAL SYSTEM VOLUME: 7.47 ft 3










Next, only the AN/SRQ-4 system was considered available for installation.
The purchasing budget remained at $2,500,000. The results are displayed in
Table 10.
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Table 10 TEST RESULTS USING $2,500,000 PURCHASING BUDGET




MSAR/LORAL 67.9 lbs 1.48 ft 3 360 W
IRLS/TI 30.0 lbs 0.61 ft 3 200 W
AN/SRQ-4/LUCAS 79.37 lbs 1.00 ft 3 150 W
TOTAL SYSTEM WEIGHT: 177.27 lbs
TOTAL SYSTEM VOLUME: 3.09 ft 3




Table 10 illustrates the effects of the increased size, electrical power requirements
and cost of the AN/SRQ-4. In this case, the model rejected the MTI radar selected
in Table 9, which contributed slightly to the decrease in identification value. More
significant is the change from a FLIR sensor to an IRLS sensor and the omission of
an ESM system, caused mainly by the increased cost of the AN/SRQ-4 data link
($1,450,000). These two factors dramatically effect the identification capabilities of
the resulting sensor payload. The rejection of both the MTI and ESM systems
contributed to the reduction in false alarm rate. This is a factor of operator
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interpretation of MTI data presentation, target recognition and ESM signals
recognition.
As discussed in Chapter II, the inclusion of an MTI sensor greatly reduces the
time required to provide 100 per cent coverage of an assigned search area. Its large
area surveillance capabilities can provide initial detection of suspected contacts of
interest and reduce the size of the AOU. Based on the author's operational expertise
and the benefits of both an MTI sensor and ESM system during RSTA missions, the
increased identification capabilities provided by the particular payload selected in
Table 9 far outweighs the increased false alarm rate.
The experiment was repeated for the third condition with a new available
purchasing budget of $5,000,000. The results are displayed in Tables 11 and 12.
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Table 11 TEST RESULTS USING $5,000,000 PURCHASING BUDGET




MSAR/LORAL 67.9 lbs 1.48 ft 3 360 W
MTI/LINCOLN LABS 55.1 lbs 1.50 ft 3 350 W
FLIR/LORAL 20.0 lbs 3.60 ft 3 60 W
ESM/DALMO VICTOR 36.0 lbs 0.42 ft 3 137 W
LCDDL/PARAMAX 18.08 lbs 0.47 ft 3 80 W
TOTAL SYSTEM WEIGHT: 197 08 lbs
TOTAL SYSTEM VOLUME: 7.47 ft 3




Table 1 1 displays the results when all three data link systems (AN/SRQ-4, Low Cost
Common Data Link (LCCDL) and PIXLINK) were considered as equally possible
competitors and the purchasing budget set at $5,000,000. The results are identical to
those displayed in Table 9.
Next, only the AN/SRQ-4 system was considered available for installation.
The purchasing budget remained at $5,000,000. The results are displayed in Table
12.
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Table 12 TEST RESULTS USING $5,000,000 PURCHASING BUDGET




MSAR/LORAL 67.9 lbs 1.48 cu ft 360 W
FLIR/LORAL 20.0 LBS 3.60 cu ft 60 W
ESM/IBM 32.5 LBS 0.76 cu ft 235 W
AN/SRQ-4 79.37 lbs 1.00 cu ft 150 W
TOTAL SYSTEM WEIGHT: 199.77 lbs
TOTAL SYSTEM VOLUME: 6.84 cu ft




The increased identification value in Table 1 1 is due to the inclusion of an MTI
sensor in the final payload. This same sensor however, causes an increased false
alarm rate in the same case. In conclusion, a UAV equipped with multiple sensors
such as moving target indicator (MTI) radar, synthetic aperture radar (SAR), ESM
and IR can cover the entire area in a fraction of the time required by the UAV
equipped with a single optical sensor. This leaves more time available for target
identification and classification, and frees the UAV to perform secondary missions if
time and fuel permit. A UAV equipped with such a sensor suite is more capable of
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providing the SAG commander with timely area coverage, valuable situational
awareness and a broader extension of the SAG's weapons and sensor systems and,
ultimately, it's sphere of influence. Given the physical constraints of the airframe,
the results of all three cases indicate that multiple sensor systems may be installed
onboard the next generation UAV. The entire payload system may be on-line and




While performing Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition
(RSTA) missions in a hostile maritime environment, expeditious coverage of
assigned areas of uncertainty (AOUs) is crucial to the success of Surface Action
Group (SAG) operations. In littoral regions especially, small, fast and maneuverable
gunboats are most likely to be encountered in areas of dense merchant shipping.
With the recent reduction in the number of MPA squadrons and overseas
deployment sites, non-organic RSTA assets may not be available to the SAG
commander during future conflicts.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) become an attractive alternative and will
allow ships without organic air assets, such as the Arleigh Burke class DDG-51
which will be the main component of future surface forces, to perform long range
RSTA missions independently of other units. This could include long duration
barrier operations in littoral regions. Even those ships with an organic helicopter
onboard will be able to generate accurate situation and targeting data against
multiple threats simultaneously using both the UAV and its LAMPS helicopter,
thereby increasing the size of its radius of influence. The UAV could also act as a
targeting platform for armed LAMPS helicopter strikes against small gunboats and
combatants or for longer range missiles such as Harpoon. The SAG commander
needs an organic RSTA asset to be aware of activities in his battle space.
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UAVs equipped solely with electro-optical (EO) sensors will prove incapable
of providing timely, accurate location and targeting data while searching large AOUs
in bounded littoral seas. This stems from the fact that the limited detection ranges
of IR systems require smaller track spacings in order to provide complete coverage
of the assigned area. As a result, SAG commanders will not receive the target track
data necessary to recognize potential threat axes on which to concentrate organic
weapons systems.
Outfitting UAVs with multiple sensor systems capable of simultaneous
operation can provide a SAG commander with timely area coverage, valuable
situational awareness and a broader extension of the SAG's weapons and sensor
systems and, ultimately, it's sphere of influence. Such a payload mix should include
radar, electronic support measures (ESM) and infrared (IR) systems capable of
searching for, detecting, classifying and tracking potential targets in large AOUs
where locating data may be time-late and inaccurate. Additionally, an electronic
data link capable of transmitting wideband imagery, IR, EO, or Synthetic Aperture
Radar (SAR) data should be included.
UAVs presently under development are capable of carrying multiple mission
payloads such as those described above and, in doing so, providing 100 per cent
coverage of an assigned area in a fraction of the time normally required by a UAV
equipped solely with IR or optical sensors. This leaves more time available for
target identification and classification, and frees the UAV to perform secondary
missions if time and fuel permit.
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The UAV PAYLOAD SELECTION MODEL is an optimization model
capable of selecting a multiple sensor payload to fit an individual UAV payload
cavity. The model determines the optimum payload based on the utility or perceived
value of the individual sensor in a RSTA mission scenario based on the user's
operational expertise, the volume of the UAV's payload cavity, the amount of
electrical power supplied by onboard electrical systems, and the weight of the
payload in pounds which the UAV is capable of carrying. Additionally,
mathematical constraints are included in the model which consider unit cost, target
identification capability, and false alarm rate when determining the optimum
payload.
The model was run for two cases under several budget scenarios. The first case
considered all available data link systems to be equal competitors, while the second
considered the AN/SRQ-4 to be the only data link system available for installation.
Given the physical constraints of the airframe, the results of both tests indicate that
multiple sensor systems may be installed onboard the next generation UAV. The
entire payload system may be on-line and operating simultaneously, thereby
increasing the platform's onstation detection capabilities. However, there are some
trade-offs between both cases. The overall size and power requirements of the
AN/SRQ-4 force the model to reject the MTI sensor and its wide area search
capabilities. This in turn reduces the overall identification capabilities of the sensor
payload because the platform is now forced to spend more time in a search pattern
rather than identifying contacts detected by the MTI system. Consideration should
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be given to selecting data link systems such as LCCDL and PIXLINK which were
designed specifically for UAV applications. Their component miniaturization,
reduced cost and low power consumption allow for greater onstation performance
capabilities while maintaining the required connectivity between the UAV and its
controlling platform.
It is a fact that future military conflicts will involve power projection in littoral
regions. It is also a fact that tactical commanders require an organic RSTA asset
capable of providing timely, multiple sensor, over-the-horizon reconnaissance.
Through this thesis, we have demonstrated that, in their present configuration, UAVs
are incapable of meeting these needs. Sensor technology is presently available,
however, which can provide UAVs with multiple sensor systems and, at the same
time, meet the requirements of the tactical commander. If we are to continue to
require our military forces to "show the flag" in areas of the world which are hostile
to the policies of the United States government, then we must ensure that they do so
with the best equipment technology has to offer. With regard to UAVs, that
technology is available today - on the open market.
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APPENDIX A: UAV PAYLOAD SELECTION MODEL FORMULATION
$OFFUPPER ONSYMXREF
$INLINECOM { }$TITLE UAV PAYLOAD SELECTION MODEL
*
$ONTEXT
The UAV PAYLOAD SELECTION MODEL is designed to determine a sensor payload
to be carried onboard the next generation UAV presently under consideration by
the UAV JOINT PROJECT OFFICE. The selected payload must be capable of




The selected payload will be capable of matching the identification
requirements set for the PIONEER UAV which performed during both Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Additionally, because the payload selected by
the UAV PAYLOAD SELECTION MODEL will include both RADAR and ESM systems, the
next generation UAV will be capable of searching larger areas of interest than
were previously possible with the PIONEER system.
The constraints used in the model are designed to conform to the design
specifications for the Maritime UAV presently under consideration by the UAV
Joint Program Office, however, with minor modifications of the PARAMETERS file,
they will conform to any version of UAV presently under consideration for
development
.
The data in the DATA file is a product of the JPO UAV Master Plan and
various articles found in the writing of this thesis. COST data, however, was
made available through industrial sources and are estimates.

















Tot Wt total payload carrying capacity for the UAV sensor system
measured in pounds
Tot_Vol total volume of the UAV s onboard payload cavity
Tot_Pwr total power available through UAV's onboard electrical
system
Tot_Cost total budget available for purchase of UAV sensor payload
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MTI_ID weighted value for identification value of MTI radar system
False_Alm mission planner's desired false alarm rate
U(j,k) utility value given to system j
W(j,k) weight of system j measured in pounds
VOL(j,k) volume of system j measured in cubic feet
PWR(j,k) power requirements for system j measured in watts
ID(j,k) identification requirements of system j
FALSE (j,k) false alarm factor for system j
COST(j,k) cost in dollars of system as quoted by manufacturer k
$ INCLUDE UAVPARa.PAR
$ INCLUDE UAVDAT3a.DAT
* Only systems with a valid utility value will be considered for employment





























Z objective function value
BINARY VARIABLE







only one of each type system will be selected by the model
the total weight of the combined selected payload will not exceed
the payload carrying capacity of the UAV
the total volume of the combined selected payload will not exceed
toat of the UAV s payload cavity.
the total amount of electrical power required to operate the
selected payload will not exceed the total power supplied by the
UAV s onboard electrical system.
the selected payload will be able to positively identify or
assist in the identification of contacts of interest. The
selected payload system must be able to at least meet the
identification standards set by the PIONEER
UAV system.
FALSEa the number of false alarms will be minimized.
COSTa the total cost of the selected payload system will be kept within
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COSTa .
.
SUM(JK, COST(JK) * X(JK) ) =1= Tot Cost
MODEL UAV / ALL /;


















APPENDIX B: UAV PAYLOAD SELECTION MODEL DATA
INDICES
SONTEXT
The following is a listing of the specific systems under consideration for employment onboard
the next generation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). In addition to the specific sensor type
(index j), the set includes a list of sensor system manufacturers (index k). For ease of selection,




j set of specific sensor systems
/ MTI Moving Target Indicator Radar
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar
MSAR Miniature Synthetic Aperture Radar
ELINT Electronic Intelligence
ESM Electronic Support Measures
FLIR Forward Looking Infrared
IRLS Infrared Line Scanner
DL Electronic Data Link
/
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k set of sensor system manufacturers
/AIL AIL





















IAI Israeli Aircraft Industries
TAD Tadiran















Note: (1) In the case where a manufacturer produces several types of sensor system j, the
manufacturer's abbreviated name has been numerically appended. For example: Loral produces two




JK(j,k) compatible system - manufacturer pairs;
$ONTEXT
A compound set which ensures that only those system - manufacturer pairs with a valid utility





The following is a listing of the design specifications limiting the capabilities of the UAV
system. They include:
payload capacity
volume of the payload cavity
power available through onboard electrical systems











Sensors presently under consideration for inclusion in the UAV sensor package include:
Moving Target Indicator Radars
Synthetic Aperture Radars






They are listed below as functions of utility, weight, volume, power, identification capability,





VALUE WEIGHT VOLUME POWER ID FALSE COST
*
* The following is a listing of RADAR systems under consideration for inclusion in the UAV
* sensor payload.
MTI.AIL 0.0130 80.0 0.95 520 o.ooe 0.167 700000
MTI.LHD 0.0130 125.0 2.00 1200 0.006 0.167 350000
MTI.LNC 0.0130 55.1 1.5 350 0.006 0.167 700000
MTI.HDL 0.0130 110.0 3.50 1050 0.006 0.167 700000
SAR.LOR 0.0400 88.0 1.25 470 0.072 0.073 730000
SAR.LOR1 0.0400 67.9 1.48 360 0.072 0.073 730000
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1000 0.033 0.040 600000
235 0.020 0.025 730000
210 0.020 0.025 550000
137 0.020 0.025 400000
The following is a listing of FLIR systems under consideration for inclusion in the UAV sensor
payload.
FLIR.WHS 0.0010 92.0 0.46 675 0.045 0.003 600000
FLIR.KOL 0.0007 55.0 0.83 275 0.045 0.003 400000
FLIR.HUG 0.0010 100.0 0.92 644 0.045 0.003 700000
FLIR.LOR 0.0016 75.0 1.78 300 0.045 0.003 350000
FLIR.LOR1 0.0040 20.0 3.60 60 0.045 0.003 350000
FLIR.IRM 0.0005 71.0 0.497 50 0.045 0.003 900000
FLIR.WHS 1 0.0002 205.0 2.56 500 0.045 0.003 600000
FLIR.PLK 0.0007 35.0 0.49 65 0.045 0.003 900000
FLIR.HON 0.0017 70.0 1.78 300 0.045 0.003 500000
FLIR.TI 0.0005 75.0 1.54 300 0.045 0.003 280000
FLIR.FMS 0.0001 42.0 1.82 350 0.045 0.003 400000
FLIR.IAI 0.0009 80.0 1.92 240 0.045 0.003 360000
FLIR.TAD 0.0002 55.0 1.35 280 0.045 0.003 900000
FLIR.BS 0.0003 104.0 3.43 150 0.045 0.003 700000
The following is a listing of IRLS systems under consideration for inclusion in the UAV sensor
payload.
;.hon 0.0003 244.0 5.90 651 0.009 0.003 500000
I.HON 1 0.0003 208.0 5.00 795 0.009 0.003 500000
1.HON2 0.0003 164.0 6.90 650 0.009 0.003 500000
;.lor 0.0006 76.0 1.80 400 0.009 0.003 4000000
1.LOR1 0.0005 144.3 3.70 545 0.009 0.003 4000000
;.LOR2 0.0003 15.0 0.20 65 0.009 0.003 600000
l.TI 0.0030 30.0 0.61 200 0.011 0.004 280000
l.CAI 0.0004 65.0 3.67 600 0.011 0.004 400000
,BS 0.0001 15.0 0.39 250 0.011 0.004 700000
;.vin 0.0003 44.0 0.46 256 0.011 0.004 500000
1.VIN1 0.0030 29.0 0.46 250 0.011 0.004 500000
The following is a listing of DATA LINK systems under consideration for inclusion in the UAV
sensor payload.
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DL.LUC 0.2450 79.37 1.00 150 1.0 1450000
DL.PAR 0.2450 18.08 0.47 80 1.0 90000
DL.MAC 0.2450 27.50 0.53 300 1.0 20000
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